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HOLD THE MAYO: AN ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF
THE NBA'S STERN NO PREPS TO PROS RULE AND THE
APPLICATION OF THE NONSTATUTORY EXEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Until the summer of 2005, O.J. Mayo's entry into the exclusive club
of talented prep basketball players who go from high school sensation to
impact professional player in the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
seemed secure.' A 6'5" swingman with a lightning-quick first step and an
accurate jump shot from long range, Mr. Mayo's skills on the basketball
floor generated a buzz even before he started high school . Like many
preps to pros stars before him, 3 Mr. Mayo transferred high schools to play
in a more competitive basketball environment, moving from his home in
Huntington, West Virginia to live with a family friend in Cincinnati.4 Mr.
Mayo thrived in Ohio, leading his team to the state title while averaging
26.7 points per game and becoming only the second sophomore to be
named Ohio's Mr. Basketball.5 Mr. Mayo's talents even have NBA scouts
uttering the phrase "can't miss," a rarity for guard prospects.6
Prognosticators widely anticipated he would be the top pick in the 2007
NBA Draft.7
During the fateful summer of 2005, however, Mr. Mayo encountered
1. See generally Seth Davis, The Next One, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 20, 2005, at 86
(describing O.J. Mayo's talent and maturity and commenting on his desirability to NBA teams).
2. See id.
3. See Harvey Araton, Ah, to Be Young, Gifted, and Drafted, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at
B9 (noting that Kevin Gamett moved from South Carolina to Chicago to play against superior
competition); Mark Heisler, From Raw to Rare, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at DI (noting that
Amare Stoudemire attended high school in both Florida and North Carolina).
4. Davis, supra note 1, at 86; See also Steve Blackledge, Mayo-mania Keeps Coach, School
on Their Toes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Jan. 6, 2006, at D8 (noting that before high school,
Mr. Mayo attended school fifteen miles away from Huntington in Ashland, Kentucky, giving him
the opportunity to take advantage of the Kentucky rule allowing students to participate in varsity
athletics before reaching high school-Mr. Mayo made first team all-state in Kentucky as an
eighth grader).
5. Davis, supra note 1, at 86 (stating the only other sophomore named Mr. Basketball in
Ohio history was current NBA phenom LeBron James, who went from preps to pros).
6. Id.
7. Gary Parrish, Best in Class, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), July 9, 2005, at D1.
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an opponent that even his immense talents could neither juke, dribble
around, nor elevate over; in fact, Mr. Mayo had no chance against this
opponent. What happened to derail Mr. Mayo's otherwise certain stardom?
Did he suffer a career-ending injury or turn his attention to another sport?
No and no-Mr. Mayo is healthy and still dedicated to basketball. 8 But
when NBA Commissioner David Stem became serious about implementing
an age minimum for participating in the NBA, Mr. Mayo's dreams of preps
to pros stardom all but dissolved.
While the play of preps to pros superstars currently in the NBA such
as Kobe Bryant, Tracy McGrady, and LeBron James made such athletes
popular with fans,9 Mr. Stem dwelled on the problems with the high school
to pro phenomenon: players that never made it in the NBA, lost out on a
free college education, and were out of work in their desired profession by
their early twenties. 10  Mr. Stem's solution: set a mandatory age that
players must reach in order to be eligible to play in the NBA. The age
minimum proposal, commonly referred to as the "age limit," became one of
many issues heavily discussed during collective bargaining sessions
between the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association
("NBPA")." The two parties reached a compromise on the age issue and
the most recent collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") went into effect
in the summer of 2005.12
Draft eligibility is governed by Article X of the new CBA.1 3 Article
X requires:
[t]he player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the
calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B) with respect to
a player who is not an international player.. . , at least one (1)
NBA Season has elapsed since the player's graduation from
high school (or, if the player did not graduate from high school,
since the graduation of the class with which the player would
8. See Jeff Rabjohns, Scouts Rate Conley Among Elite Prep Point Guards, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, July 31, 2005, at C4 (noting that in the summer of 2005 Mr. Mayo played a prominent
tournament and still is considered the top player in the class of 2007).
9. Greg Sandoval, Prep-to-Pros Try to Make the Grade, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at D6.
10. See infra Part II.B.1.
11. See John Manasso, Stern Warns Union of Lockout Damage, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June
13, 2005, at C8 (stating that the NBA and players disagree on a variety of issues, including the
length of contracts, the minimum age requirement, and drug policy).
12. Childs Walker, NBA, Union Make Peace With 6-year Deal, BALT. SUN, June 22, 2005,
at IC.
13. NBA Player's Association, CBA Articles, http://www.nbpa.com/cbaarticles/article-
X.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
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have graduated had he graduated from high school). 1
4
In addition to satisfying the age requirement, potential NBA draftees must
communicate in writing their express intent to be selected in the NBA
draft.' 5 The NBA must receive this declaration at least sixty days before
the draft.
1 6
Article X will not dash Mr. Mayo's hopes of NBA stardom, it will
only postpone them. Like many other talented high schoolers, Mr. Mayo is
weighing his post-high school options.17  He could sign a large
endorsement deal and sit out a year, play in college for a year, or play
professionally in a minor league or overseas for a year. 8 Another option
available to Mr. Mayo and those similarly situated would be to challenge
Article X in court.
This Comment will focus on the latter of these options. Part II will
provide background to this discussion, looking at the recent trend of NBA
early entries and documenting the NBA's shifting attitude towards these
players, chronicling the collective bargaining process from its start in the
1960s through the most recent 2005 agreement. Part II will also examine
how the natural tension between anti-trust law and labor law is reconciled
by the judicially created nonstatutory exemption to anti-trust law. Part III
will discuss how this tension has played out in the NBA and in other
professional sports leagues by examining the different approaches courts
have taken in determining whether to apply the nonstatutory exemption,
focusing on the split between the Eighth and Second Circuits. Part IV will
discuss Article X's validity by applying the various tests and determining
that a challenge to Article X brought on traditional anti-trust grounds will
likely fail, as the nonstatutory exemption will be applied no matter which
circuit's test is used. Part V will consider the expansive interpretations
given to the language of the two tests, discuss the difference between the
tests the two circuits use and argue that the Second Circuit's test is too
expansive. Part VI will note reasons why, despite a low chance of success,
a suit challenging Article X might be brought. Part VI will also address
other legal potential legal challenges to Article X. Finally, Part VII will
conclude that the courts should favor the less expansive language of the




17. See Parrish, supra note 7, at D1; Pete Thamel, High School Players Have New Set of
Choices, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 8.
18. See Thamel, supra note 17, at 8.
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II. BACKGROUND
In order to examine the basics of a potential challenge to Article X, it
is important to understand how NBA labor relations reached this point.
This part will (A) review how the explosion of NBA basketball players
leaping from preps to pros in the last ten years led Commissioner Stem to
call for an age limit; (B) comprehensively examine the NBA's collective
bargaining history; and (C) explore the basic tension between anti-trust law
and labor law.
A. The Rise of Preps to Pros Players
High school players have been eligible for the NBA draft for over
thirty years. In 1970, Spencer Haywood paved the way for high schoolers
when he successfully challenged the NBA's draft eligibility rule requiring
that a player's college class graduate before he can sign a contract with a
team in the league.' 9 In response to the district court's holding that the
draft eligibility rule violated anti-trust laws,20 the NBA developed a
"hardship" rule, allowing underclassmen to petition for NBA draft
eligibility on the basis of financial hardship.2 ' In 1976, the NBA dropped
the rule after the meaning of "hardship" eroded.22 The NBA then adopted a
rule opening the draft to any player whose high school class had graduated,
provided that he renounced his college eligibility in writing forty-five days
before the NBA drafty.
Despite longstanding eligibility of high schoolers, it has only been in
the past ten years that NBA rosters have exploded with players drafted
straight out of high school 24 based on achievements and upside similar to
Mr. Mayo's. This revolution began with Kevin Garnett's controversial
decision to declare himself eligible for the NBA draft in 1995.25 Mr.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. Janny Hu, Debate for the Ages: Some Players Oppose Move to Bar Teenagers,
S.F.GATE, Mar. 6, 2005, at D7.
22. J.A. Adande, Trailblazers for a Cavalier, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at D1 (quoting
NBA Commissioner Stem explaining the decision to drop the "hardship" rule: "People who came
from wealthy parents were helping to redefine what 'hardship' was.").
23. Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality of
Preventing High School Athletes and College Underclassmen From Entering Professional Sports
Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 553 (1998).
24. See Sandoval, supra note 9, at D6 (stating that beginning with Kevin Garnett in 1995,
high school students have been routinely drafted).
25. Marc Stein, Potential? This Texas High Schooler has it in ... , DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, at lB.
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Garnett was the first player to attempt the jump straight from high school to
the NBA since Daryl Dawkins in 1975.26 Mr. Gamett's success
encouraged dozens of prep stars to forgo college basketball and enter the
NBA draft directly.27  These players had remarkable success, as
demonstrated by the 2005 NBA All-Star rosters, in which four of the ten
starting spots belonged to preps to pros players.28
As soon as high schoolers began declaring themselves eligible for the
NBA Draft, critics questioned the logic of allowing them to play.29 Mr.
Stem was one of the first to suggest limiting high schoolers' access to the
NBA, floating the idea of an age limit in 1996.30 However, he was not
always adamant that high school players be denied the ability to enter the
NBA right out of high school. In 1996, the year after Mr. Garnett declared,
Mr. Stem struck back at critics by asking why they did not criticize teenage
hockey and tennis stars.3 1 Although he expressed a preference for older
NBA players, he nevertheless stated "it's for them and their parents to
make the decision rather than all of us sanctimoniously and piously making
these judgments. 32
However, by 1999, Mr. Stern changed his tune and began a quest to
impose an age limit.33 While his reasons for imposing an age limit have
varied, one recently articulated rationale is to prevent high school gyms
from becoming overrun with agents who mislead players by telling them
they are ready for the NBA when they really need to practice and gain
greater experience at the college level.34 Mr. Stern also has stated that time
spent in college would help season a potential professional basketball
player's life skills.35 In addition, economics also plays a role. Mr. Stem
explained, "[I]t affects our business, in terms of our responsibility, the way
26. Michael Cunningham, The Fountain of Youth, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Mar. 10, 2005, at
1C.
27. Id.
28. Hu, supra note 21, at D7.
29. See, e.g., Mark Heisler, These Babies Could Use More Time in the Crib, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1996, at C8 (criticizing the potential decision by current NBA All-Star Jermaine O'Neal
to enter the draft and incorrectly predicting: "If he tries the NBA, his pro career is likely to be
over long before it ever should have started.").
30. See Selena Roberts, Stern Questions the Outrage Over Early Entry to N.B.A., N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1996, at C4 (quoting Stem stating "[W]ith the help from the players association,
we would raise the age limit a bit higher, I'm sure.").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Jeffrey Denberg, Stern Wants to Stop High School Players From Entering Draft,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 20, 1999, at E12.
34. Desmond Conner, Bynum Has a Test Left, HARTFORD COURANT, May 29, 2005, at E5.
35. Marc J. Spears, NBA Leaders: Q&A NBA, DENVER POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at DI.
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we are viewed, the players' maturity and how they deal with the
community. 36
NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter initially indicated that he had
an open mind with regards to the age limit issue.37 However, a month after
Mr. Stem made his 1999 suggestions, NBA players met and voiced
opposition to imposing an age limit.38 Mr. Hunter's open mind quickly
closed, and he began shifting the responsibility of drafting high schoolers
to management, stating "[i]f they don't want them in the league, they
shouldn't draft them.",39 By the end of that summer, the issue was placed
on the proverbial backburner.4 °
Though the age limit remained a nonstarter through the turn of the
century, Mr. Stem continued to push for it. While giving his annual State
of the League address in 2004, he reiterated his preference for an age
limit,41 expressing his opinion that the district court decided the Maurice
42 43Clarett case incorrectly. However, no movement towards actually
implementing an age limit occurred.
As Mr. Stem continued to call for an age limit, NBPA Executive
Director Billy Hunter continued to resist any such limit.44 Mr. Hunter had
the players' support behind him. In a February 2005 poll of 151 NBA
players conducted by the Rocky Mountain News, an overwhelming 71.5
percent favored maintaining the existing standard.45 In March 2005,
Jermaine O'Neal, who joined the league after high school, criticized the
idea of an age limit, reasoning that it did not make sense to deny a player
an opportunity to gain experience in his chosen profession.46 Mr. O'Neal
36. Harvey Araton, There Are Different Ways to Season Raw Talent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2005, at D1.
37. Stern Wants Age Limits For Draftees, TAMPA TRIB., June 22, 1999, at 6.
38. Players Oppose Age Limit, Rules Changes, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 9, 1999, at
3D.
39. Bart Hubbuch, Age-Old Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 21, 1999, at lB.
40. NBA Minimum Age on Back Burner, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1999, at 2.
41. Harvey Fialkov, Stern Calls For Age Limit of 20, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.),
Feb. 15, 2004, at 7C.
42. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Clarett I].
43. Greg Sandoval & Steve Wyche, Age Requirement Being Discussed, WASH. POST, Feb.
15, 2004, at E9 (quoting Mr. Stem's reaction to the initial Clarett decision, "[t]he Clarett decision
is wrongly decided as a matter of law and will likely be reversed on appeal.").
44. Id.
45. Chris Tomasson, Their Two Cents' Worth About A Minimum Age, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Colo.), Feb. 18, 2005, at 4N.
46. Liz Robbins, Age Limit: One Player's Path Is Another Player's Roadblock, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 7 (quoting Mr. O'Neal, "[w]hat is it that college teaches you? ...
College don't [sic] really teach you to be a great N.B.A. player on and off the court. College
teaches you about college. What can better teach you about dealing with the N.B.A. than the
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implied that the prospective age limit had racial undertones because it
would deny viable opportunity to young black players.47 However, some
players supported the age limit, as four-year college player Grant Hill
indicated by commenting,
I always thought that it was the purpose of the union to protect
its members, not potential members .... I think if anyone gets
left out, it's the older players, guys who put equity into this
league, card-carrying members paying their dues to the union. I
would hope they would be protected.48
Despite the players' strong preference against an age limit, as the
summer of 2005 approached, Mr. Stern still had two reasons to be
optimistic. First, several cautionary tales of not-yet-ready high schoolers in
the pros lent credibility to his call for an age limit. Second, the current
CBA was set to expire, requiring a new round of collective bargaining that
would require the players to take the age limit proposal into account.
B. The Collective Bargaining Process
1. Cautionary Tales
While high schoolers such as Kobe Bryant and LeBron James have
succeeded in the NBA, not every preps to pros player becomes an All-Star.
Korleone Young dominated in high school and had the grades to attend
college; instead, he chose to declare for the draft, thinking he was a lock for
the first round.49 The Detroit Pistons selected him in the second round and
he played one year before getting cut.50 He has since played in basketball's
minor leagues and is hoping for another NBA opportunity.51
While some high school players, such as Mr. Young, are not
physically prepared to play in the NBA, other players may not be mentally
ready for NBA life. Leon Smith, a first round draft pick out of high school,
took 200 aspirin pills in a suicide attempt and was arrested for threatening
his estranged girlfriend before he ever even took a shot in the NBA.
Kwame Brown, the first prep player to be drafted first overall, signed a




49. Sachin Shenolikar, NBA 101, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED FOR KIDS, Oct. 2001 at 69, 74.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Mark Heisler, A Troubled Maverick, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1999, at D1.
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a suit to the dry cleaners, or even that suits needed to be dry cleaned after
wearing.53
The examples involving Mr. Young, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Brown are
just some of the issues faced by prep school players who decide to bypass
college. Armed with these cautionary tales, Mr. Stem headed to the
collective bargaining table.
2. Coming to the Table: Let's Discuss It
Collective bargaining is the process by which employers and
employees determine the terms and conditions of employment.54 These
parameters are summarized in the CBA.55 While professional basketball
has existed in the United States for over eighty years,56 players have only
collectively bargained with management for forty years.5" The NBA
formed in 1949 when the Basketball Association of America merged with
the National Basketball League.58 Although the NBPA formed in 1954, the
NBA did not recognize it as "the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all NBA players" until 1964. 59 Bob Cousy founded the
NBPA in 1954 and began discussions, but not negotiations, with the NBA
in 1957.60 A breakthrough occurred in 1964 when the NBPA's second
president, Tom Heinsohn, decided to play hardball with management.61
Upset because they lacked a pension plan, Heinsohn and the NBA
players threatened to boycott the first televised NBA All-Star game.62
Minutes before tip-off, NBA Commissioner Walter Kennedy promised that
a pension plan would be adopted at the next owners meeting.63 The owners
made good on Mr. Kennedy's promise and later adopted a pension plan to
53. Sally Jenkins, Growing Pains, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2002, at 20.
54. Jason R. Marshall, Fired in the NBA! Terminating Vin Baker's Contract: A Case-Study
in Collective Bargaining, Guaranteed Contracts, Arbitration, and Disability Claims in the NBA,
12 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 10 (2005).
55. Id. at 11 ("[T]he collective bargaining agreement is a remarkable document. It
incorporates the party's own rules of conduct and operation, establishes a system of internal self-
government,.. . [p]arties formulate collective agreements in response to particular needs.").
56. MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM, 23 (1997) (noting that the first "broadly based
professional league," the American Basketball League, started in 1925).
57. See NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, http://www.nbpa.com/history.php (last
visited Feb. 22, 2006).
58. DANIELSON, supra note 56, at 24.




63. Robert Bradley, Labor Pains Nothing New to the NBA, History of NBA Labor,
http://hometown.aol.com/apbrhoops/labor.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).
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be equally funded by players and owners.64
Despite this success, player and owner harmony did not last long. In
1967, after the NBPA expressed a desire for both a reduced exhibition
schedule and payment for play in exhibition games, it announced a plan to
meet with representatives from other professional sports leagues to discuss
unity among athletes. The owners reacted to these announcements by
threatening to cancel the playoffs.65 The NBPA countered by threatening
to apply for certification with the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") and to strike during the playoffs for an enhanced pension.66 The
tension finally ended when the two sides signed their first CBA in 1967.67
Anti-trust issues, however, soon mounted. Upon the CBA's
expiration in 1970, NBPA president Oscar Robertson filed a class action
suit against the NBA,68 seeking to prevent a merger with the newly formed
American Basketball Association ("ABA") and to obtain a declaration that
certain NBA practices, such as the college draft and the reserve clause,
violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.69 In denying the NBA's motion for
summary judgment, the court held the exemption only shields unions, not
employers, from anti-trust scrutiny.70  The court also held that the
questioned provisions violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but questions
of fact remained as to whether they had been collectively bargained for and
therefore protected under the nonstatutory exemption.71
The two sides settled the case in 1976, memorializing their agreement
in the "Robertson Settlement. '' 72 The terms of the Robertson Settlement,
including modification of the college draft and institution of a right of first





68. Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
69. Id. at 874 (explaining that the college draft is a system through which each NBA team
obtains exclusive rights to negotiate with a college player and that the reserve clause is a part of
the Uniform Contract allowing a team to "unilaterally to renew and extend the Uniform Contract
for one year on the same terms and conditions including salary" if the player will not sign a
contract to play during the next season).
70. Id. at 884-85.
71. Id. at 895-96.
72. NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) [hereinafter Williams 1].
73. Id. at 1073 (explaining that the right of first refusal allows a player who has played
fewer than four years and had less than two contracts to negotiate with any other team in the
league when his contract expires, but the incumbent team has the right to match any offer made
by another team).
74. Id. at 1072.
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NBA and the NBPA agreed to a new three-year CBA.75 When the 1976
agreement ended on June 1, 1979, the two sides adopted a new CBA on
October 10, 1980.76
The expiration of the 1980 agreement on June 1, 1982, provided the
NBA an opportunity to add a new provision into the latest CBA: the salary
cap.77 Claiming imminent financial destruction, the NBA advocated a cap
on total player salaries.78  The NBPA challenged the cap,79 and under the
terms of the Robertson Settlement, a special master was appointed to hear
the dispute.80 The special master held that a salary cap would violate the
Robertson Settlement, thereby requiring the two sides to enter into a
Memorandum of Understanding modifying the Robertson Settlement to
include a cap.8 1
The extended 1980 agreement expired at the end of the 1986-87
season.82  As the season wound down, the NBA and NBPA signed a
moratorium agreement on June 8, 1987, promising to conduct good faith
negotiations and postpone any litigation. 3 After the moratorium period
expired, the players filed suit, claiming the NBA's continued operation
under the terms of the most recent CBA violated anti-trust laws.84 In
Bridgeman v. NBA, the New Jersey District Court disagreed with the
players' argument, 5 and the two sides eventually settled the lawsuit.86 The
settlement resulted in the 1988 CBA, continuing "the college draft, the
right of first refusal and the salary cap, 87 but providing unrestricted free
agency for the first time.
88
The 1988 agreement expired on June 23, 1994.89 Shortly thereafter,
the NBPA filed suit again challenging the college draft, the salary cap, and
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D.N.J. 1987).
78. See Williams , supra note 72, at 1072.




82. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 963.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 965 (noting players argued the nonstatutory exemption should no longer provide
anti-trust protection once the CBA expires).
86. NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note 57.
87. Williams I, supra note 72, at 1072.
88. NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note 57.
89. Williams I, supra note 72, at 1072.
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right of first refusal on anti-trust grounds. 90 The district court ruled in favor
of the owners finding no anti-trust violations. 91 The NBA and NBPA
reinitiated collective bargaining pending appeal of NBA v. Williams and
played the 1994-95 season under a "no strike/no lockout" agreement.
92
In June 1995, after the Second Circuit affirmed the Williams
decision,93 two sides reached a hand-shake deal for a new six-year CBA.
94
But several high profile players, including Michael Jordan and Patrick
Ewing, threatened to decertify the union.95 Lacking a formal, signed
agreement on July 1, 1995, the NBA locked out the players.96 The NBPA
instituted an August 8, 1995 deadline for an agreement to be reached or the
union would no longer fight decertification.97 Just ten minutes before
midnight, the parties reached an agreement, receiving crucial salary cap
concessions, 98 but still faced the decertification challenge. 99 By a vote of
226 to 134, the NBPA members rejected decertification, implicitly
approving the new CBA.' 00
The 1995 CBA contained a provision allowing the NBA to opt-out if
player salaries exceeded 51.8 percent of basketball-related income. 1' By
1998, player salaries topped fifty-seven percent of basketball-related
income.102  The owners voted to re-open the CBA for negotiation,'0 3
leading to a lockout which lasted six months10 4 and forced the NBA to miss
90. NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note 57.
91. Williams I, supra note 72, at 1079.
92. NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note 57.
93. NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Williams II].
94. See Scott Howard-Cooper, NBA Makes Labor Deal at I 1th Hour, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1995, at C1.
95. Id. (noting that decertification strips a CBA of anti-trust protection).
96. NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note 57.
97. Howard-Cooper, supra note 94; NBA Player's Association, NBPA History, supra note
57.
98. Murray Chass, N.B.A. and Union in Agreement at Midnight Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1995, at B7 (explaining that the NBPA received a one million dollar exception allowing teams
over the salary cap to sign free agents, an exception allowing teams to replace injured players at
half that player's salary, and a modified Larry Bird exception).
99. Id.
100. See Mark Asher, Labor Dispute Ends With No Objections, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
1995, at D2.




104. Murray Chass, In Final Staredown, Players Take the Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1999, at
July 20061
486 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:475
games because of a labor problem for the first time in league history.'0 5
Finally, in January 1999, the NBA and the NBPA reached an agreement
which ended the lockout. 10 6 The key concession the NBA received from
the NBPA was an individual salary cap.'
07
In December 2003, the NBA exercised its option to extend the CBA
through the 2004-05 season and the two sides agreed to meet consistently
to try to develop a new agreement by July 1, 2005.108 By February 2005,
the sides were optimistic but were still weary of a possible lockout.' 09
Both sides had two reasons to avoid a lockout. First, the significant
economic damage suffered in the 1999 lockout-players lost $500 million
and owners lost $1 billion in revenue' 1°-was fresh in their minds. Second,
the National Hockey League's ("NHL") season crumbled in 2004-05 due
to labor strife, and the NBA took note of the potential implications of failed
negotiations.111
Despite these concerns, the two sides still had no agreement only two
weeks before the existing CBA stood to expire.1 12 By that point, the NBA
had backed away from the twenty-year old age limit and offered to impose
only a nineteen-year-old age limit.113 The NBA and NBPA went back to
the bargaining table and finally came to an agreement on June 21, 2005.114
The final terms shortened guaranteed contracts, guaranteed the players
fifty-seven percent of the NBA's yearly $3 billion in basketball-related
income, and instituted a nineteen-year-old age limit. 115 The current CBA
lasts through the 2010-11 season, and the NBA has the option to extend the
deal an additional year.' 
16
105. See Wise, supra note 101, at C1.
106. Walker, supra note 12, at IC.
107. See Mark Bradley, Believe It: NBA Better for Lockout, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 8,
1999, at C7 (stating the CBA imposed a maximum salary of $14 million per season for players
with 10 years experience).
108. See NBA, Players Union Extend Labor Agreement, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 9,
2003, at D3.
109. See John Reid, NBA Hopes to Avoid Another Labor Mess, TIMES-PICAYUNE (La.),
Feb. 20, 2005, at 2.
110. Lacy J. Banks, Stern Optimistic About Labor Accord, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005.
111. See Liz Robbins, N.B.A. Expects Smoother Path To Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2005, at DI (quoting Mr. Stem's reaction to the NHL canceling its season, "We are keenly aware
of the danger of not making a deal.").
112. See Manasso, supra note 11, at C8.
113. Id.
114. See Walker, supra note 12, at IC.
115. Id.
116. NBA Players Association, CBA Articles, supra note 13.
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C. Anti-Trust v. Labor Law
In order to understand the path a high school prep star might take to
challenge Article X of the CBA, one requires an understanding of anti-trust
and labor law. The Second Circuit noted the difficulty in navigating the
tension between the two fields of law when it commented that "[t]he
interaction of the Sherman Act and federal labor legislation is an area of
law marked more by controversy than by clarity"'1 17  Nonetheless, this
Comment will humbly attempt an explanation. The conflict between anti-
trust law and labor law arises from the fact that anti-trust law intends to
prevent restraints on trade, whereas labor law prefers and promotes
unionization, preventing individuals from contracting, and therefore,
restrains trade.' 
18
1. Anti-Trust Doctrine: Thou Shalt not Restrain Trade
Before getting into the basics of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, it
should be noted that not all professional sports leagues are created equal
when it comes to anti-trust jurisprudence. The national pastime's
professional organization, Major League Baseball, has been exempt from
anti-trust scrutiny since 1922.1 19 The exemption is based on the Supreme
Court's finding that baseball games are "purely state affairs" and therefore
not interstate commerce subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. 120 Thirty years later, the Court refused to overrule baseball's anti-trust
exemption, holding that, due to Congressional inaction after Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, Congress must not have intended to include baseball in
anti-trust laws. 2 1 While the Supreme Court later recognized that baseball
is engaged in interstate commerce, it upheld the exemption under the
principle of stare decisis. 122 After Toolson v. New York Yankees, Congress
did act to bring baseball within federal anti-trust laws, 23 but did not hit a
117. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
118. See Jocelyn Sum, Note, Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
807, 810 (2005).
119. See Fed. Baseball Club of Bait., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 200 (1922).
120. Id. at 208-209.
121. Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356-357 (1953).
122. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
123. See id. at 281 (noting that in between Toolson and Flood, more than fifty bills
regarding anti-trust laws applying to baseball were introduced in Congress).
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home run until President Clinton signed the Curt Flood Act of 1998.124
This Act applied federal anti-trust laws to baseball labor disputes, but left
other practices, such as franchise relocation and expansion, outside federal
anti-trust laws. 125 Despite criticism of the exemption 126 and congressional
threats to revoke it, 127 the exemption remains in place today. The Supreme
Court and other courts have refused to extend an anti-trust exemption to
other professional sports leagues, 128 holding that Federal Baseball is an
"aberration confined to baseball." 129
The authors of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act intended to prohibit all
restraints on trade.1 30  In practice, however, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as applicable only to undue
restraints on trade.' 3' An analysis under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
requires the sitting court to use a "Rule of Reason test" to analyze whether
a restraint on trade is reasonable. 132 This test requires a court to undertake
a detailed, elaborate analysis of the facts of the business involved, the
nature of the restraint, the condition of the business before and after the
restraint, and the real and potential effects of the restraint., 33  To save
resources and to minimize the number of times a court has to undertake this
time consuming analysis, 134 the Supreme Court determined that certain
restraints are per se illegal.1 35 Examples of practices the Supreme Court at
124. See Morgen A. Sullivan, "A Derelict in the Stream of the Law": Overruling
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 48 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1266 (1999).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1304.
127. See Mark Starr & Eve Conant, A Major League Mess, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2005, at
27 (noting Congress most recently threatened baseball's anti-trust exemption during the steroid
scandal).
128. See Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (basketball); Radovich v. NFL, 352
U.S. 445, 451 (1957) (football); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955)
(boxing); N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (soccer);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U. S. Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1981) (tennis); U. S.
Trotting Ass'n v. Chi. Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 794 (7th Cir. 1981) (horse racing); Wash.
State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pac. Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 1966) (bowling);
Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (golf); and Boston Prof'l Hockey
Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972) (hockey).
129. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (1972).
130. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911).
131. Id. at 60.
132. See Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
133. Id. at 238.
134. See Rosner, supra note 23, at 543-44.
135. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) ("[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.").
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one time has determined to be per se illegal include price fixing, 136 tying
arrangements, 137 horizontal market divisions,
138 and group boycotts.' 39
This Comment will focus on group boycotts, the most likely
allegation a high schooler challenging Article X will make. 140  A group
boycott has alternatively been referred to as a "concerted refusal[] by
traders to deal with other traders . ,,. 141 A group boycott technically
pertains to competing businesses acting together to block other businesses
from entering the market; on the other hand, a concerted refusal relates to
competing businesses collectively refusing to engage with an individual,
whether for competitive or noncompetitive reasons.1 42  The individual
targeted in a concerted refusal to deal is not necessarily a competitor.
143
Any challenge to Article X of the NBA's CBA should be an allegation of a
concerted refusal to deal, because it involves collusion by NBA franchises
not to employ a player, a noncompetitor, based on his status as a high
schooler.
After the Supreme Court found group boycotts per se illegal in
1941,44 it firmly reinforced this holding in 1959.145 However, just four
years later, the Court granted an exception to per se illegal status of group
boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal. 146  In Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, the Court stated group boycotts would be a per se violation of
anti-trust rules "absent any justification derived from the policy of another
statute or otherwise ... , An exception to per se status is granted if: 1)
the collective action is required by the structure of the industry, 2) the
restraint is reasonably implemented, and 3) the procedural safeguards exist
"to prevent unnecessary and arbitrary application.' 48  If this test is
136. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
137. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). But see Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2. 15-16 (1984) (holding that the entity engaging in tying
must have sufficient market power to force purchaser into a tying agreement before a per se rule
will be applied).
138. See United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 357 n.5 (1967).
139. See Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941). But see infra
note 152.
140. See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High
School Players From the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 201 (2004).
141. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
142. Rosner, supra note 23, at 545 n.34.
143. Id.
144. See Fashion Originator's Guild, 312 U.S. at 467-68.
145. Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 212.
146. See Silver v. N. Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963).
147. Id. at 348-49.
148. Peter Altman, Note, Stay Out For Three Years After High School Or Play In Canada
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satisfied, the alleged restraint on trade will be subjected to the Rule of
Reason analysis. 1
49
The Supreme Court further eroded the per se illegal status of group
boycotts in the 1980s. 150 In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Company, the Court refused to apply the per se
approach when the plaintiff did not preliminarily allege "that the
challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anti-
competitive effects."' 151 The Court reaffirmed this limitation on the per se
rule during the next term.152 Thus, if a plaintiff cannot show that the action
in question will likely have anti-competitive effects, then the Rule of
Reason analysis will apply. 1
53
2. Federal Labor Policy: Pro Union, Pro Collective Bargaining
While the federal government disfavors restraints on trade, it also
favors unionization of workers.1 54 Tension inevitably arises because the
purpose of unions is to negotiate the best deal for all employees, but this is
an inherent restraint on trade because it reduces competition.' To avoid
an anti-trust issue, two exemptions exist that allow unionized employers to
operate under the law, the so-called statutory and nonstatutory
exemptions.1
56
The statutory exemptions began with the Clayton Act of 1914,
followed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA"). 157 Section 6 of the Clayton Act exempts
organized labor from anti-trust scrutiny as long as organized labor does not
stray from its normal and legitimate purpose. 1
58
The Norris-LaGuardia Act expressed a federal preference for
-And For Good Reason: An Antitrust Look At Clarett v. National Football League, 70 BROOK.
L. REv. 569, 578 (2004).
149. Id. at 578-79.
150. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
298 (1985) (noting that care is needed when applying the per se rule).
151. Id.
152. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (noting "the
category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately" and "we
have been slow to ... extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business
relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.").
153. See id.
154. See Sum, supra note 118, at 810.
155. See McCann, supra note 140, at 196.
156. See Rosner, supra note 23, at 546-47.
157. McCann, supra note 140, at 196.
158. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
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organized labor' 59 by, among other devices, stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear cases involving labor disputes, including cases alleging
an anti-trust violation was alleged. 60 Finally, Congress enacted the NLRA,
to promote a federal policy by favoring collective bargaining on wages,
hours, and other working conditions.'61 However, despite the
expansiveness of the federal statutory exemption from antitrust laws, the
statutory exemption does not apply to negotiations or agreements between
labor and management. 62 The Supreme Court recognized the necessity for
a rule protecting such actions and carved out the "nonstatutory exemption"
to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
163
The Supreme Court established the nonstatutory exemption in two
1965 companion cases.164 In Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., a local employer challenged an agreement between Chicago
area butchers and supermarkets in which meat was only to be sold between
nine a.m. and six p.m., Monday through Saturday. 165 The Supreme Court
upheld the agreement, reasoning that business hours and days of the week
constitute mandatory subjects under the NLRA. 166 In United Mine Workers
of America v. Pennington, the Supreme Court limited the nonstatutory
exemption by holding that a collectively bargained for agreement between
a coal-miners union and management that imposes on another group of
employers cannot be exempted from anti-trust scrutiny.' 67 The Supreme
Court further defined the nonstatutory exemption in Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.168 In Connell, the Court
refused to apply the exemption to an agreement a Dallas union forced upon
general contractors, which required the general contractors to use only
subcontractors employing members of the union. 169 The Court held that
federal labor policy offers no protection when unions conspire with non-
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
160. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 101-
03 (1940).
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
162. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1965).
163. See id.
164. See generally, Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 381
U.S. 676 (1965); UMWA v. Pennington 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
165. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 680.
166. Id. at 685.
167. UMWA, 381 U.S. at 665.
168. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-26.
169. See id. at 618-21.
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labor groups to restrain competition.17 0 The result of the Connell decision
is that the nonstatutory exemption only protects actions approved by
federal labor laws.
1 7 1
In summary, the nonstatutory exemption creates an exception to
federal anti-trust laws by allowing restraints on trade, "so long as such
restraints operate primarily in a labor market characterized by collective
bargaining. ' 17' However, if the collective bargaining is not approved or
protected by the nonstatutory exemption, anti-trust law will apply. While
the nonstatutory exemption has been addressed in the sports league
context, 173 the exact scope of the nonstatutory exemption is unclear because
it is judicially created. To gauge the outcome of an Article X challenge, it
is important to look at how the nonstatutory exemption has been applied in
past challenges to CBAs.
III. PAST SPORTS ANTI-TRUST/LABOR LAW DECISIONS
This part will begin in Part A by looking at an instance when the
Supreme Court used anti-trust analysis to strike down an NBA draft
eligibility provision. Part B will examine the application of the
nonstatutory exemption in two parts. The first part will focus on the
differing approaches taken by the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit.
The second part will review the Supreme Court's most recent examination
of the nonstatutory exemption in the sporting context by looking at a case
involving the unilateral imposition of a provision after the collective
bargaining reached an impasse.
A. Spencer Haywood Challenges the System ... and Wins
The first challenge to the NBA's draft-eligibility rules came in 1971
from a young superstar named Spencer Haywood.1 74 The result of Mr.
Haywood's successful challenge to the NBA's draft rules was
revolutionary, and looking back, even NBA Commissioner Stem can
170. Id. at 622-23.
171. Id. at 625.
172. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 134 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Clarett I1] (quoting
Mid-America Reg'l Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881,
893 (7th Cir. 1982)).
173. See generally, id. at 125.
174. Curtis Bunn, The Mass Exodus: Cause: Long Before Entering the NBA Draft Early
Grew Common, Spencer Haywood Waged a Lonely Fight to Have the Right, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Nov. 16, 2003, at 2Q.
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appreciate Mr. Haywood's contributions.
175
The NBA's draft eligibility policy at the time of Mr. Haywood's suit
prevented any player from being drafted until four years after graduating
from high school.' 76  The rival ABA had a similar provision, but
accommodated players if they plead hardship. 177 Mr. Haywood used the
hardship exception to sign with the ABA's Denver franchise. 178 When he
turned twenty-one, he rejected the ABA contract by claiming fraudulent
inducement.179  He then signed a contract with the NBA's Seattle
Supersonics. 180 However, he signed the NBA deal while still ineligible to
be drafted. 18'
Mr. Haywood's attempt to join the NBA was met with opposition
from both leagues.18 2 The ABA's Denver franchise did not want to lose its
rising star, so it filed for a preliminary injunction to prevent him from
jumping to the NBA. 83  Mr. Haywood defeated Denver's preliminary
injunction, leaving him free to sign a NBA contract.1 84 However, under
pressure from other franchises that felt Seattle had performed an unfair end
run around the draft, 185 then NBA Commissioner Walter Kennedy refused
to accept the contract. 86 Mr. Haywood filed suit, alleging that the draft
eligibility rule was a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.' 87 He asked for and obtained a preliminary injunction allowing him to
play for the Supersonics.' 88  The Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary
injunction but the Supreme Court reinstated it.'
89
On remand, the district court granted Mr. Haywood summary
judgment on his anti-trust claims. 90 The court held that the draft eligibility
175. Id. (quoting Mr. Stem, "Spencer is the trailblazer in that regard. He was the plaintiff in
a case that has had important ramifications. It has reformed player eligibility to our league.
That's big.").
176. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
177. Id. at 1060.
178. Id.
179. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-05 (1971).
180. Id. at 1205.
181. Id.
182. See Rosner, supra note 23, at 551.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. McCann, supra note 140, at 217-18.
186. Id.
187. Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205.
188. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1066-67.
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rule constituted a group boycott and was thus per se illegal. 91 The court
refused to apply the Rule of Reason test through the Silver exceptions
because Mr. Haywood was not allowed a hearing before being excluded
from the draft.1 92 Implicitly, this meant that if some procedural safeguards
did exist, then the Rule of Reason test could have applied.
193
The Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt decision is important because it
shows both the birth of opposition to the NBA's draft eligibility rules and
the use of anti-trust doctrine in a sporting context. The Denver Rockets
decision is not the only professional sports league case that has involved an
anti-trust analysis. Courts have performed anti-trust analyses in cases
involving professional sports leagues using both the Rule of Reason
analysis' 94 and declaring certain actions per se illegal.195
While Denver Rockets is significant, it is important to note that it
dealt with a rule that was not the result of collective bargaining.' 96 The
dawn of the era of collective bargaining in professional sports means that
federal labor law, not anti-trust law, will be the primary force governing the
validity of labor provisions. 1
97
B. The Nonstatutory Exemption in Action
The nonstatutory exemption can be applied in two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, it is applied to provisions in an existing CBA. In the
second scenario, the nonstatutory exemption is applied when there is no
191. Id. at 1066.
192. Id.
193. McCann, supra note 140, at 218.
194. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (using the
Rule of Reason test to hold that the NFL draft was an unreasonable restraint on trade); Neeld v.
NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a NHL by-law banning a one-eyed
player from participating in the league was a reasonable restraint on trade using a Rule of Reason
analysis); Deesen v. PGA, 358 F.2d 165, 171 (9th Cir. 1966) (using Rule of Reason analysis to
determine that his exclusion from the professional golf tour following a subpar 1958 season was
an acceptable restraint on trade).
195. See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp 1315, 1317, 1323 (D. Conn. 1977)
(explaining that a district court issued a preliminary injunction in a nineteen-year old player's
challenge to the World Hockey Association's ("WHA") twenty year old age limit. The court
reasoned that the WHA's age limit constituted a group boycott and, after finding that the Silver
exceptions did not apply, declared that the age limit was per se illegal); Boris v. U.S. Football
League, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *3, *8 (C.D. Cal 1984) (declaring as per se illegal the
United States Football League's ("USFL") draft eligibility provision that prevented players from
being drafted unless players used up all college eligibility, graduated from college, or five years
had passed since players entered college).
196. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
197. Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1971).
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CBA. This situation arises when either the current CBA has expired and
the parties are still operating under its terms, or management has
unilaterally imposed terms after collective bargaining has reached an
impasse. Although any challenge to Article X would fall under the first
category, it is instructive to look at the application of the nonstatutory
exemption when no current CBA exists because the cases collectively show
the deference courts are willing to give to federal labor policy.
1. The First Scenario and Eighth Circuit: Exploring Mackey
a. Mackey Sets the Standard
The first important case to show how the nonstatutory exemption
applied to professional sports was a challenge to a component of the NFL's
free agency system, called the "Rozelle Rule," named after then NFL
Commissioner Pete Rozelle. In Mackey v. NFL, 98 players challenged the
Rozelle Rule, 199 which required a team signing a free agent to compensate
the player's old team.200 If the teams could not agree on compensation, the
commissioner could step in and award the disadvantaged team draft picks
or players from the poaching team's roster.20 ' The commissioner's
discretion embodied in the Rozelle Rule gave teams reason to hesitate
before signing a free agent, thus potentially working as a restraint on
trade.20 2
The Eighth Circuit crafted a three-part test to determine when the
nonstatutory exemption should apply, considering whether: 1) the
restrictions affect only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; 2)
the assailed practice concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining; and 3) the
203restriction is a product of bona fide, arm's length bargaining. The court
did not analyze the first prong, stating that it was "clear" that the Rozelle
Rule only impacts parties to the CBA. 20 4 The court next found that, while
on its face the Rozelle Rule did not appear to concern a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, the prong was nonetheless satisfied because
whether the practice concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining depends
198. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
199. Id. at 609 n.2 (explaining that some players sought an injunction preventing the NFL
from using the Rozelle Rule, while others sought an injunction as well as damages).
200. Id. at 609 n. 1.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 609.
203. See id. at 614.
204. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
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on practical effect, not form.20 5 The court determined that the Rozelle Rule
related to wages, and thus concerned a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining because the rule restricts a player's movement and thus
"depresses player salaries." 206
The Eighth Circuit found the Rozelle Rule failed the third prong,
however.20 7 The court held the NFL unilaterally imposed the rule on a
weak National Football League Player's Assocation ("NFLPA") in 1963,
the rule never changed in subsequent CBAs, and the players received no
quid pro quo from the NFL in exchange for including the Rozelle rule in
the current CBA.2 °8 Implicitly, the Eighth Circuit held that the parties'
failure to discuss the Rozelle Rule more than tangentially 20 9 meant that the
rule violated the test. The court finally used a Rule of Reason analysis to
find the Rozelle Rule ran afoul of federal anti-trust law.210
b. Everybody Loves Mackey
Since the Mackey decision, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning has been
widely followed by courts deciding whether to apply the nonstatutory
exemption in a sports law case.211 One of the first applications of the
Mackey test came in a challenge to the NHL reserve rule in McCourt v.
Cal. Sports, Inc. 212 The reserve rule was a provision in the CBA between
the NHL and National Hockey League Players Association ("NHLPA").213
When a player switched clubs as a free agent, the rule mandated
compensation in the form of players, draft choices, or cash, to the player's
former team.214  The rule mirrored a similarly questioned provision in
Mackey and the Sixth Circuit referred to it as a "modified Rozelle Rule. 215
The challenge to the NHL's reserve rule came from Dale McCourt, a
Detroit Red Wings player selected by an arbitrator to serve as
compensation for the Los Angeles Kings when the Red Wings signed
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 616.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 616 n.17.
210. Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, 620-22 (8th Cir. 1976).
211. Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption In Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1058 (1994).
212. McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1979).
213. Id. at 1195.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1194.
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Kings goaltender Rogatien Vachon as a free agent.216 Rather than report to
the Kings, Mr. McCourt filed a lawsuit alleging that the reserve rule
violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.217
The Sixth Circuit used the Mackey elements to decide if the
nonstatutory exemption applied to the NHL's reserve rule.218 The court
found that the first element was satisfied because "the hockey players
themselves... [were] primarily affected., 219 Next, the court held that the
reserve rule concerned a mandatory subject because it restricted player
movement between teams, thereby impacting player financial interests.
220
The case therefore turned on whether the NHL's reserve rule was the
subject of bona-fide arm's length bargaining. 221 The Sixth Circuit started
by stating that just because one side does not change its position does not
mean that collective bargaining has not taken place.222 The court listed the
various attempts by the NHLPA to stop the NHL from including the
reserve rule.223 While the NHLPA's efforts did not succeed in eliminating
the reserve rule, the efforts did lead to other concessions.224 Therefore, the
court held that the reserve rule resulted from bona fide negotiations and
that the nonstatutory exemption should apply.
225
Another application of the Mackey test came in a challenge to the
NFL's supplemental draft.22 6 In the early 1980s a rival professional
football league, the USFL, signed numerous NFL-caliber players. 27 Some
of these USFL players were also drafted by NFL teams in the hopes that
they would become available to play for the NFL at a later date. 228 The
NFL feared that only the better teams would be able to "invest" in USFL
players, so it proposed limiting certain rounds of the existing player draft to
selection of players already under contract with the USFL or another
216. Id. at 1196.
217. Id. at 401.




222. Id. at 1200 n.9 (quoting Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000), which
defines collective bargaining as meeting and conferring over wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, but not requiring a concession).
223. Id. at 1202 (noting the NHLPA tried to develop an alternative reserve rule system,
threatened to strike, and threatened to file an anti-trust suit).
224. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1202 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1979).
225. Id. at 1203.
226. See Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
227. Id. at 401.
228. Id.
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league, or alternatively developing a supplemental draft for USFL
players.229  The NFL and the NFLPA agreed upon a three-round
supplemental draft.23° Since the NFL's CBA allowed for a fixed number of
draft picks each year, the CBA needed to be modified.231 In exchange for
allowing the supplemental draft, the NFL agreed to keep the active player
roster at forty-nine during the 1984 season. 2
The NFL's New York Giants selected Gary Zimmerman in the
supplemental draft while Mr. Zimmerman was still employed by the
USFL.233 Upset that he would only be able to negotiate with one team-
the Giants-if he chose to jump leagues, Mr. Zimmerman filed a lawsuit
alleging that the supplemental draft violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 4
The court used the Mackey test to determine if the nonstatutory
exemption should apply to the supplemental draft.235 Both sides agreed
that the supplemental draft concerned a mandatory subject of collective
236bargaining, therefore satisfying the second Mackey prong. Mr.
Zimmerman first argued that because it primarily impacts USFL players
who are not parties to the CBA, the supplemental draft did not satisfy
Mackey's first prong. 7  The court disagreed, noting this prong was
intended to deny application of the exemption to agreements mainly
impacting competitors of the employer.238 As a potential NFL player, Mr.
Zimmerman was not a competitor, and thus a party to the CBA.239
Once again, the key issue became whether the provision in question
was the subject of bona fide, arms length negotiations.24 ° Mr. Zimmerman
argued the NFL's quid pro quo was not mentioned in the letter modifying
the CBA and that the quid pro quo was meaningless and thus was not the
subject of good faith negotiations.24'
The court defeated Mr. Zimmerman's first point by reiterating the
holding in McCourt, stating that a tangible quidpro quo reduced to a single
229. Id.
230. Id. at 402.
231. See id. at 401.
232. Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 402 (D.D.C. 1986) (noting that active player
rosters could have been reduced to forty-five under the terms of the current CBA).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 401.
235. See id. at 403-08.
236. Id. at 404.
237. Id. at 405.
238. Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C. 1986).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 406.
241. Id. at 407.
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document is unnecessary, as only good faith bargaining is needed.242 In
rejecting Mr. Zimmerman's second argument, the court noted that it was
not its duty to determine the adequacy of consideration.2 43  Thus, the
supplemental draft satisfied the Mackey prongs and the nonstatutory
exemption applied.244
2. The First Scenario and the Second Circuit Test: Rejecting Mackey
Despite the wide acceptance of the Mackey test, the Second Circuit
recently created a new standard in Clarett v. NFL.245 The next part will
review the cases that laid the foundation for a circuit split and then examine
Clarett's more flexible standard for applying the nonstatutory exemption.
a. Seeds of a Circuit Split
Several cases involving challenges to the NBA's collective bargaining
set the stage for the current circuit split. In 1984, the Philadelphia 76ers
drafted 0. Leon Wood in the first round of the NBA draft.24 6 The NBA's
newly imposed salary cap required teams that exceeded the maximum
allowable aggregate team salary to sign new first-round draft picks to one-
year contracts for $75,000.247 The 76ers were over the cap, so they offered
Mr. Wood such a contract, but assured his agent that the team would make
roster adjustments allowing it to sign Mr. Wood to a long-term deal worth
more money.248 Mr. Wood neither signed the $75,000 contract nor waited
for the 76ers to make another offer.24 9 Instead, Mr. Wood sued the NBA
claiming the salary cap and the draft violated the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.
250
The district court analyzed the claim using the same considerations as
Mackey and denied Mr. Wood's request for a temporary injunction.25' In
Wood v. NBA, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, but
242. Id.
243. Id. at 408.
244. Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 408 (D.D.C. 1986).
245. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 133, 140-143.
246. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 958 (2d Cir. 1987).
247. Id. at 957.
248. Id. at 958.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. See Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that Mr. Wood's
anti-trust claim fails because the college draft and salary cap are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, affect only the parties to the CBA, and resulted from bona fide arms-length
negotiations).
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utilized a different analysis.252 On appeal, Mr. Wood alleged the NBA's
policies were illegal because they prevented him from achieving full-
market value, disadvantaged new employees, and impacted players outside
the bargaining unit.253 The Second Circuit rejected Mr. Wood's claim that
he was prevented from achieving full-market value as contrary to federal
labor policy favoring collective bargaining.254 While acknowledging the
downsides of this policy, the court was not persuaded to overturn the
explicit federal policy in favor of unionization.2 55 The court also rejected
Mr. Wood's claim that the policies were illegal because they disadvantaged
new employees, holding that it is normal for terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to discriminate based on seniority.256 Finally, the
court rejected Mr. Wood's claim that he was outside the bargaining unit by
noting that it is commonplace for CBAs to impact workers beyond
members of the union signing the CBA.257 The court also noted that the
NLRA defines the term "employee" to include persons outside the
bargaining unit.258  As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that Mr.
Wood's claim had to be rejected because it would subvert federal labor
policy.
259
The next Second Circuit case, Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n,
involved Joe Caldwell, who played in the ABA and served as president of
260the ABA's union. In 1974, a player on Mr. Caldwell's team, frustrated
by his contract, sat out a game as a negotiating tactic.261 Team officials
asked Mr. Caldwell if he knew the location of the player, but Mr. Caldwell
252. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
253. Id. at 959-960.
254. Id.
255. Id. (noting an individual employee may receive less compensation than he would
through individual negotiations and that highly specialized professional athletes differ from
industrial workers).
256. See id. at 960 ("A collective agreement may thus provide that salaries, layoffs, and
promotions be governed by seniority .. "); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330,
331 (1953) (upholding a union's decision giving individuals credit towards seniority for pre-
employment military service, stating "satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be
expected.").
257. See id. (noting clauses in CBAs can prevent outsiders from bidding on a job or provide
for subcontracting work to be limited to certain groups of workers).
258. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960-61 n.3 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he definition
provides.., that the term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise." (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000))) (emphasis in original).
259. Id. at 963.
260. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1995).
261. Id. at 525-26.
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said that he did not know. 2 6 2 The team suspected Mr. Caldwell knew the
player's location, and suspended him from the team.263 After initially
appealing the suspension to the union, Mr. Caldwell decided to fight the
suspension through litigation and won. However, he never played again in
the league.264 A year later, Mr. Caldwell filed suit, alleging he had been
blackballed in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 265  The NBA,
which had merged with the ABA, defended by arguing that Mr. Caldwell
was over-the-hill and injured.266
The district court performed an anti-trust analysis and granted
summary judgment in favor of the NBA without referring to the
nonstatutory exemption.267 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit applied
the nonstatutory exemption.268 While acknowledging that Mr. Caldwell's
claims were not as inconsistent with federal labor policy as the claims of
Mr. Wood, the Second Circuit nonetheless held that if his claims
proceeded, the fundamental principles of federal labor policy would be
subverted.269 The court noted that Congress decided federal labor policy
"required a specialized agency equipped to find facts, to apply the NLRA,
and to impose particular remedies": the NLRB.27 ° Mr. Caldwell chose to
bring his claim under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, instead of pursuing
remedies under the NLRB.27' In affirming the district court's grant of
summary judgment, the Second Circuit acknowledged that previous
decisions involving professional sports allowed such suits to proceed, but
to do so here would frustrate federal labor policy.
272
The final Second Circuit case is NBA v. Williams.273  The NBA's
1988 CBA was set to expire in 1994, and the NBPA demanded three
provisions-the college draft, the right of first refusal, and salary cap-not
be included in a new CBA.274 When the NBPA refused to negotiate until
the 1988 CBA expired, the NBA sought a declaration that continued
262. Id. at 526.
263. Id.
264. See id. (noting that Mr. Caldwell won his entire 1974-75 salary with interest, costs and
expenses).
265. Id. (explaining that the case was delayed as Mr. Caldwell went through bankruptcy).
266. See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 526 (2d Cir. 1995).
267. See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 825 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
268. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 527.
269. Id. at 530.
270. Id. at 527.
271. Id. at 530
272. See id. at 530-31.
273. Williams II, supra note 93, at 684.
274. Id. at 686.
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operation under the 1988 CBA would not violate anti-trust laws.275 The
players counterclaimed, alleging that continued imposition of the
questioned terms violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 76
The district court dismissed the NBPA's counterclaim, holding that
the nonstatutory exemption applied "and antitrust immunity exists as long
as a collective bargaining relationship exists." 277  The Second Circuit
affirmed.278 In a stinging rebuke of the players' claim, the Second Circuit
commented, "In Wood... we noted that 'no one seriously contends that the
antitrust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal
labor policy.' The present case appears to have proven us wrong because
just such a contention is being seriously made., 279 In affirming the district
court's grant of declaratory relief to the NBA, the Second Circuit held that
if the players' claim succeeded, federal policy enacted by Congress
allowing multi-employer bargaining would be frustrated. 80
Taken together, these three cases illustrate the Second Circuit's
adherence to federal labor policy while avoiding Mackey. A true circuit
split did not exist, however, until the Second Circuit decided Maurice
Clarett's challenge to the NFL's draft eligibility rules.28'
b. Clarett: The Background
After a stellar freshman season at The Ohio State University in 2002,
Maurice Clarett ran into some off-the-field troubles that forced him to sit
out his sophomore year.28 2 As a result, Mr. Clarett decided to try to enter
the NFL draft. 2 3  The NFL, however, only allows college athletes to
declare for the draft three years after their high school class graduates.
28 4
Mr. Clarett graduated high school in December 2001, meaning at the time
of the lawsuit he was one year away from NFL draft eligibility.28 5 In order
to avoid sitting out an entire year of organized football, Mr. Clarett filed
275. See id. (The NBA also claimed that the provisions the players wanted removed were
lawful even if anti-trust laws applied.).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 686-87 (internal quotations omitted).
278. Id. at 688 (noting that federal labor laws permit multi-employer organizations to
collectively bargain with employees).
279. Williams II, supra note 93, at 690 (citation omitted).
280. See id. at 693.
281. See Sum, supra note 118, at 814.





suit, alleging the NFL's draft eligibility rules unreasonably restrain trade
and violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.286
c. District Court Decision: Mackey Solidarity
The district court agreed with Mr. Clarett and found that none of the
Mackey elements were satisfied.287 Judge Scheindlin found that the draft
eligibility provision did not address a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, because the NFL's rule "precludes players from entering the
labor market altogether" as opposed to regulating the player once the player
enters the labor market.288 In addition, the agreement did not apply only to
parties to the CBA, since it applied to Mr. Clarett;289 thus, the court held
this prong was not satisfied.290 Finally, the court held the draft eligibility
rule was not the subject of bona-fide arm's length negotiations because the
NFLPA waived the ability to bargain for it.
291
d. Mackey Sacked For a Loss in the Second Circuit
The NFL appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed the district
court while rejecting the Mackey test. 292 The Second Circuit declared it has
"never regarded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the
appropriate limits of the nonstatutory exemption. 293 The court determined
that its decisions in Wood, Caldwell, and Williams, which stressed the
importance of federal labor policy when applying the nonstatutory
exemption, were proper precedents.294 It further held that the Supreme
Court's view of the nonstatutory exemption in Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc.295 is not inconsistent with Second Circuit precedent.
296
The Second Circuit noted that the issue to decide was whether
exposing the NFL draft eligibility rules to anti-trust analysis would
"subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.' 297  In
286. Id.
287. See Clarett I, supra note 42, at 393-397.
288. Id. at 395.
289. See id. at 396.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 125.
293. Id. at 133.
294. Id. at 135.
295. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); See also discussion infra Part
IV.3.C.
296. See Clarett I, supra note 172, at 135.
297. Id. (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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answering affirmatively, the Second Circuit adopted a unique analytical
framework to approach the application of the nonstatutory exemption,298
but justified its approach using a rationale similar to the Mackey factors. 99
First, in finding the NFL's eligibility rules to be mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining,300 the Second Circuit held that as a "literal
condition for initial employment," the eligibility rules are mandatory
subjects.30 ' The court also noted that, in the professional sports context,
rules that do not appear to be mandatory subjects actually are mandatory
subjects when examined more critically.30 2 Using a critical eye, the Second
Circuit noted the eligibility rules are mandatory subjects because they
impact wages and working conditions for NFL players, e.g., securing
veteran's jobs by keeping younger players out of the NFL.30 3
Second, the court held that the NFL's eligibility rules do not
impermissibly affect non-union players.30 4 The court stated that eligibility
rules are permissible bargaining subjects because they are similar to union
demands for hiring hall arrangements, where employment eligibility is set
by the entire hiring hall and not a single employer.30 5 The Second Circuit
held that once a collective bargaining relationship is established, employees
can collectively bargain for any bar on prospective employees as long as it
does not violate unfair labor or discrimination laws.306
Finally, the court rejected Mr. Clarett's protest that the NFL's
eligibility rules were not the subject of collective bargaining because the
rules were part of the NFL Bylaws and Constitution and that if the NFLPA
had wanted to put them on the table, it could have.307 In addition, the court
held that since the NFLPA signed a waiver forgoing rights to challenge any
provision in the NFL Bylaws and Constitution and the waiver was in the
CBA, the eligibility rules should be enforced for the duration of the
CBA.308  The court further stated that requiring the provision to be
298. Recent Case: Antitrust Law - Nonstatutory Labor Exemption - Second Circuit
Exempts NFL Eligibility Rules from Antitrust Scrutiny - Clarett v. National Football League, 369
F.3d 124 (2d. Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1381 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter HARVARD LAW
REVIEW].
299. See Sum, supra note 118, at 821.
300. Clarett 11, supra note 172, at 139.
301. Id.
302. See Id. at 140.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 140-41.
305. Id.
306. Clarett II, supra note 172, at 141.
307. Id. at 142.
308. Id.
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contained explicitly in the CBA, or to be the subject of a specific quid pro
quo, would reduce a union's ability to negotiate and compromise
effectively. 30 9 Thus, in an effort to be consistent with federal labor policy,
the court held that it is acceptable to uphold against anti-trust scrutiny a
term not explicitly found in a CBA.31°
In essence, the Second Circuit created a broader test that includes, but
is not limited to, the Mackey factors, and does not make any single Mackey
factor dispositive. 311  The difference is the treatment of bona-fide
bargaining: the Mackey test is satisfied only when the parties explicitly
bargain over a provision, whereas the Clarett test allows a provision to be
valid if the parties could have bargained for it.
312
3. The Second Scenario: The Nonstatutory Exemption Working Overtime
The second area where the nonstatutory exemption applies is when no
CBA exists. Though the facts in these cases differ from a challenge to
Article X, they are still instructive as to the importance of federal labor
policy's goal of promoting collective bargaining and the scope of the
nonstatutory exemption.
a. The Nonstatutory Exemption's Full Court Press: Bridgeman
In 1987, the CBA between the NBA and NBPA expired before the
parties were able to come to a new agreement.313 The NBPA stood firmly
entrenched against restraints on players such as the salary cap, the college
draft, and the right of first refusal.314 The parties signed a "moratorium
agreement" postponing any lawsuit or player signing, but it expired without
a renewed CBA and the NBA continued to operate under the terms of the
most recent CBA.3 5 At the end of the moratorium period, the NBPA filed
suit alleging that the protection afforded by the nonstatutory exemption
disappeared the moment the CBA expired and that the NBA's current
operating scheme violated anti-trust laws.31 6
In Bridgeman, the court began by reiterating the rationale for the
309. Id. at 142-43.
310. Id. at 143.
311. See HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 298, at 1382.
312. See Sum, supra note 118, at 821.
313. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 963 (D.N.J. 1987).
314. Id. at 962-63.
315. Id. at 963.
316. See id. at 961, 964.
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nonstatutory exemption.317  Recognizing that federal labor policy
encourages collective bargaining, the court held that the nonstatutory
exemption did not disappear the instant the CBA expired.318 The court
noted that agreements frequently expire without a new deal in place, and if
a CBA lost anti-trust protection the moment it expired, management would
be reluctant to collectively bargain for anticompetitive restraints out of fear
that employees would file suit the moment the agreement expires.
However, the court rejected the NBA's assertion that the nonstatutory
exemption endures forever, reasoning that the anti-trust exemption only
applies as long as the restriction remains unchanged and the employer
reasonably believes the restraint will be included in the next CBA.32°
b. The Nonstatutory Exemption in Overtime: Powell
In 1987, the NFL's CBA expired without a new agreement, and the
NFL "maintained the status quo on all mandatory subjects of bargaining"
under the prior 1982 CBA.32' In response, NFL players went on strike, but
failed to achieve a new agreement. 2  The players then sued, alleging that
the First Refusal provision of the 1982 agreement no longer enjoyed the
protection of the nonstatutory exemption.32 3
In Powell v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit initially noted the
"comprehensive array of remedies" available to management and unions
after the CBA expires and even after the point of impasse.324 The Eighth
Circuit recognized that federal law was developed to encourage
negotiation, not intervention by the courts.325 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit
found no anti-trust violation and held that the nonstatutory exemption still
applied to the NFL's 1982 CBA.326 The Eighth Circuit did not determine
how long the nonstatutory exemption lasted, but noted that it should be
available through a claim's adjudication before the NLRB.327
317. Id. at 965 (noting the need to balance between federal anti-trust and labor laws, and
encouraging "good faith bargaining on important issues").
318. Id.
319. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965-66 (D.N.J. 1987).
320. Id. at 966-67.
321. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1989).
322. Id. (noting the goals of the strike were to change the NFL's stance on veteran free
agency and veteran salaries).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 1302.
325. See id.
326. Id. at 1304.
327. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989).
HOLD THE MAYO
c. The Nonstatutory Exemption's Supreme Test in Overtime: Brown
The Supreme Court last reviewed the application of the nonstatutory
exemption in the professional sports context nearly ten years ago, in a case
involving payment of NFL practice squad players.32 8 During negotiations
for a new CBA, the NFL proposed that each practice squad player be paid
the same salary. 329 The NFLPA rejected this offer and the parties reached
an impasse. 330  As a result, the NFL unilaterally imposed the weekly
salary. 331 A group of practice squad players filed suit, claiming the salary
violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.332
In Brown, the district court held that the nonstatutory exemption ends
when the CBA expires, so it denied the NFL the ability to use the
nonstatutory exemption as a defense to uphold the NFL's unilateral
imposition of practice squad player salaries.333 The case went to a jury
which found that the NFL violated anti-trust laws and awarded treble
damages exceeding $30 million.334 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the nonstatutory exemption applied "so long as such
restraints operate primarily in a labor market characterized by collective
bargaining., 335 Thus, when appealed, the Supreme Court's task was to
determine whether the nonstatutory exemption applied beyond impasse.33 6
The Supreme Court started by assuming that federal labor policy did
not prohibit an employer's action of implementing a last, best offer once
negotiations reached an impasse.337  Since the practice in question was
supported by federal labor policy, the Court held that the nonstatutory
exemption applied.338 First, the Court reasoned that the action post-
impasse would be acceptable under federal labor policy because labor laws
allow various actions by employers after impasse.339 Second, the Court
frowned upon using anti-trust law to decide the matter because this would
328. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996) (stating that in the NFL each
team is allowed to maintain a practice squad consisting of a limited number of rookie players who
practice with the team and stand ready to replace injured players on Sundays).
329. Id. at 234-35 (noting proposed salary was $1,000 per week).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 235.
332. Id. at 234-35 (claiming a restraint of trade because it forced each player to play for the
same pay rather than allowing each player to negotiate his own contract).
333. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D.D.C. 1991).
334. Brown, 518 U.S. at 235.
335. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d. 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
336. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 238.
337. See id.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 245.
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make courts arbitrators of what is good collective bargaining-something
that should be determined by the parties.
340
The Court rejected arguments made in the briefs by the petitioners
and their supporters about where to draw the line for applying the
nonstatutory exemption.341  Notably, the Court explained that the
nonstatutory exemption is not limited "only to understandings embodied in
a collective bargaining agreement., 342 In addition, the Court reasoned that
the nonstatutory exemption is acceptable in this case because impasse is a
process that naturally occurs during collective bargaining and is often
temporary.343 Finally, the Court stated that while athletes are "special"
because they have special skills, they are indistinguishable from other
organized workers when it comes to federal labor law.344
In concluding, the Court indicated that the nonstatutory exemption
applied because of factors very similar to the three elements announced by
the Mackey court.345 The Court did not say that every unilateral imposition
by management would be protected.346 However, the Court declined to
establish guidelines regarding situations when a unilateral imposition by
management is too attenuated from collective bargaining.347
IV. APPLYING THE TESTS
This part will apply both the Eighth and Second Circuit tests to
determine whether Article X would survive a challenge by a prep star who
wishes to go directly to the NBA from high school. Before moving
forward, note that this part proceeds on the assumption that courts will
follow the recent trend to avoid an anti-trust analysis in favor of looking to
the nonstatutory exemption when examining this problem. Conversely,
should the potential reviewing court buck the trend and look to anti-trust
law, the analysis should address whether the Silver exceptions and the
340. See id. at 240-4 1.
341. Id. at 243.
342. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 243 (1996).
343. Id. at 245.
344. Id. at 248-50.
345. See id. at 250 (While not specifically mentioning Mackey by name, the Court noted
that the employer "conduct took place during and immediately after a collective-bargaining
negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining
process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it
concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship.").
346. See id. (mentioning that "an agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant
in time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process that a rule permitting anti-
trust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process.").
347. See id.
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Northwest Stationers pleading requirements are met before subjecting the
alleged group boycott or concerted refusal to deal to a Rule of Reason
Analysis. However, it is likely federal labor policy will be the focus of any
court's discussion.
A. The Article X Restrictions Impact Only Those Parties to the CBA
At first glance, it would seem that this prong is not satisfied, but
precedent dictates that potential NBA players are parties to the CBA.
3 48
Logically, parties that are not a part of the union and thus not represented at
the bargaining table are not parties to the CBA, but for legal purposes,
however, these parties are included under the CBA.
3 49
In Wood, the Second Circuit held that a new draftee is subject to the
League's eligibility rules, even though Wood was playing amateur
basketball at the time the NBA and the NBPA consummated the deal.35°
This decision remains on solid footing. The Fifth Circuit clearly
enunciated the principle that not only are the individuals signing the CBA
impacted by its terms, but "[t]he duty to bargain is a continuing one, and a
union may legitimately bargain over wages and conditions of employment
which will affect employees who are to be hired in the future."35' In
addition to judicial decisions, the NLRA provides a statutory reminder,
defining the term "employee" to include certain other persons in addition to
workers within the bargaining unit.
352
Both judicial and statutory precedent indicate that the term "parties to
the CBA" should be interpreted expansively. As a potential employee, a
high schooler is considered a party to the NBA's CBA, thereby satisfying
this part of the test. Furthermore, as Clarett's first prong is identical to the
test developed in Mackey, the outcome will be the same under both tests.
B. Article X Concerns a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
The next issue is whether the term in question is a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. According to the NLRA, mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining include wages, hours, and working conditions.353
Determining whether a provision relates to a mandatory subject
348. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
349. See id.
350. See id. at 957 (noting Mr. Wood was drafted in 1984 and the CBA was agreed upon in
1983).
351. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966).
352. See Wood, 809 U.S. at 960-61 n.3.
353. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
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"depends not on its form but on its practical effect."354 In Mackey, the
Eighth Circuit determined that while the "Rozelle Rule" dealt only with
inter-team compensation on its face, in practice, it "restrict[ed] a player's
ability to move from one team to another and depresse[d] player
salaries. 355 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Clarett held that the NFL's
eligibility rules are tied to the NFL salary cap, creating mandatory entry-
level salaries for all rookies.356
Based on these precedents, Article X is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. Article X, like the eligibility rule in Clarett, is tied
to the NBA salary cap, which also provides mandatory salaries for the first
three years of an entry-level player's career based on the player's draft
position. The fact that a player's salary is tied to his draft position
potentially depresses his salary, as in Mackey. Thus, the eligibility rules
are a mandatory subject. Since Clarett kept this second prong identical to
the test developed in Mackey, the outcome will be the same under both
tests.
C. Article XIs the Subject of Bona-Fide Negotiations
The final question is whether Article X is the subject of bona-fide
collective bargaining negotiations. This analysis created a split among the
Second and Eighth Circuits. In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit found no bona-
fide collective bargaining when a provision was included unilaterally in a
CBA that, notwithstanding the provision was bargained for as a whole.357
By contrast, in Clarett, despite the fact that the NFL eligibility rules were
not expressly bargained for, the Second Circuit applied the nonstatutory
exemption.358
Here, from all appearances, the eligibility rule was one of the more
prominent features of the new CBA. While intimate details of the
negotiations are a mystery, what is known is that NBA Commissioner Stem
had been calling for a twenty-year-old age limit for years leading up to the
most recent collective bargaining session.359 But in order to facilitate the
deal and avoid a lockout, the Commissioner had to reduce the request to
nineteen. 36 If Article X is litigated, evidence uncovered in discovery will
354. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
355. Id.
356. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 139-140.
357. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
358. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 142-43.
359. See Denberg, supra note 33, at E12.
360. See Manasso, supra note 11, at C8.
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likely reveal that Mr. Stem's concession matched a concession by the
NBPA.3 6' Even if there is no specific quid pro quo for Mr. Stem's change
in position, it seems beyond question that the age limit was discussed in
collective bargaining based on the numerous references Mr. Stem made to
his desire to make this change over the past five years. Therefore, the
Mackey test's requirement of collective bargaining is satisfied. Since the
Clarett test is more permissive than the Mackey test-because it simply
requires that the provision be part of an agreement which is collectively
bargained for on the whole-there is no problem satisfying this test, either.
In sum, no matter which test is used to analyze a potential challenge
to Article X, the nonstatutory exemption will apply and Article X will be
upheld. Nevertheless, the Circuit split endures and thus the question
remains: which test is superior?
V. CIRCUIT SPLIT: A CASE OF No HARM, No FOUL? No WAY
Any potential challenge to the NBA's CBA will fail if analyzed under
either existing test. Does that mean that there is no difference between the
Eighth Circuit and Second Circuit tests? The answer is no. This part will
look at the policies behind the respective tests and analyze the logic behind
them. Specifically, this part will examine the expansive definition of the
terms of the first two prongs of each test, then discuss the split in the third
prong, and conclude that the Eighth Circuit's test for applying the
nonstatutory exemption is superior.
A. The First Prong
As previously discussed, the definition by which a party is considered
within the bargaining unit is very expansive.362 While this definition means
that an industry newcomer-like an NBA draft pick-might be frustrated
and struggle through his first couple of years, such an expansive definition
is still necessary to support federal labor policy.
Federal labor policy supports collective bargaining. 363  Collective
bargaining is efficient in that it allows management and workers to make
decisions impacting their entire workforce. The necessity of collective
361. See Nicholas Wurth, Article, The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the National
Basketball League After the Second Circuit's Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 127 (2005) (stating a proposed age limit rule "will be presumed to have
been the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.").
362. See supra Part IV.A.
363. See Sum, supra note 118, at 810.
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bargaining was recognized by the Second Circuit in Wood.3 64 In rejecting
Mr. Wood's claim, the court noted that to agree with Mr. Wood would
mean "hardly a collective agreement in the nation would survive." 365 The
point is that if each new employee to an industry made his own rules,
collective bargaining would be worthless. Thus, while the definition of a
bargaining unit is expansive, it is necessary to support federal labor policy.
B. The Second Prong
The second prong deals with mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, which include wages, hours, and conditions of employment.366
While on the surface it would appear that the NBA's eligibility rule does
not relate to wages, courts have held that the substance, not the form, is key
in these circumstances.367 Thus, the prevailing view is that this concept of
what impacts wages is also interpreted expansively.
368
There are two ways to interpret this issue. The first interpretation
holds that when a person is ineligible for a job, the eligibility requirement
does not impact that person's wages at all.369 Under this line of thinking,
Article X, which makes high schoolers ineligible for the draft, is not a
mandatory subject. In the second interpretation, an examination of
inferences and natural results of an eligibility rule could be tied to other
wage conditions. 370  Thus, under this line of thinking, Article X is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
While expansive, the latter interpretation makes more sense. The
impact on player wages can come from various factors such as the size of
the market where the team is located, price of tickets, and concessions. In
looking at "conditions" of employment, the Ninth Circuit has held that "the
phrase 'terms and conditions of employment' is to be interpreted in a
limited sense.... In order for a matter to be subject to mandatory collective
bargaining it must materially or significantly affect the terms or conditions
of employment. 371 Similarly, it is no stretch to think that a relation to
wages must not be too attenuated. It does not require too many logical
steps to understand that an eligibility rule limits the number of players
364. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987).
365. Id.
366. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See Clarett I, supra note 42, at 393.
370. See Clarett 11, supra note 172, at 140.
371. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in
original).
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available to play in the NBA, and therefore keeps veterans employed and
their wages high. Additionally, eligibility rules are connected to wages
because they limit the number of rookies entering the NBA each year.
Moreover, first year players are subject to a rookie salary scale, which in
turn impacts the salary cap. The salary cap is perhaps the ultimate
controller of wages, as it limits the total salary that a team can pay to its
players. The expansive interpretation of wages draws a connection
between eligibility rules and a player's paycheck. Therefore, these
interpretations comfortably satisfy the Ninth Circuit's standard because
these types of considerations are not too attenuated to place eligibility rules
outside what is considered a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
C. The Third Prong
As previously stated, the third prong is where the Second and Eighth
Circuits disagree. The Eighth Circuit provides that a provision must be
collectively bargained for. However, the Second Circuit applies the
nonstatutory exemption as long as a provision is contained in an agreement,
which as a whole was collectively bargained for. While the expansive
language of the first two prongs is permissible, 372 the Second Circuit's
approach here goes too far because it exempts issues never collectively
bargained for.
1. The Power of the Prongs
The Second Circuit's expansive language is inappropriate due to the
power given to the parties of the CBA by the first two prongs. In the first
prong, parties to the collective bargaining agreement have the power to
determine the fate not just of union members, but also of people who do not
have a seat at the bargaining table.373 Second, the expansive nature of what
relates to "wages" in collective bargaining means that as long as something
can be rationally related to the bottom line during a collective bargaining
session, it can be deemed to be a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.374
With this expansive power, union representatives would be required
to know what they are giving away when they sign an agreement. If a term
that is part of a CBA is not articulated in the CBA, it needs to be discussed
explicitly during bargaining or needs to be included unambiguously in a
372. See supra Part V.A-B.
373. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
374. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987).
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waiver375 or stipulation. Critics of this policy object on the grounds that
this makes collective bargaining "self-defeating. '" 37 6 They rationalize that
such a policy will discourage concessions and require a party to put up
mock opposition to the other side's proposals to create a detailed record of
quid pro quo.377 The critics further assert that unions would try to bargain
for as little as possible, hoping that what is not mentioned at a collective
bargaining session would therefore automatically be unavailable for
protection under the nonstatutory exemption.378
These arguments miss the point. The next two parts of this section
show that the Mackey test is superior because it will not slow down the
bargaining process by forcing detailed negotiations over immaterial
provisions in a CBA, and it is more consistent with federal labor policy.
2. The Mackey Test Does Not Require Collective Bargaining Over
Insignificant Details
A bona-fide collective bargaining requirement under the Mackey test
does not require fictitious opposition or concessions to impose terms that
are undisputed between the two parties. The requirement simply
necessitates that parties address the agreement during bargaining.
While the Rozelle Rule failed the third prong in Mackey because the
Eighth Circuit could not find a quid pro quo, a closer examination of the
court's rationale shows that what was important was the discussion of the
term.37 9 In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit held that there was no quid pro quo
because the discussion of the Rozelle Rule was tangential to other potential
concessions being made.38 0 The importance of a discussion, rather than a
specific quid pro quo, was made clearer in McCourt, as the Sixth Circuit
found bona-fide collective bargaining even though the NHL did not budge
from its original position on the Reserve Rule.381 The Supreme Court
concurred in this rationale in Brown, when it found that bona-fide
collective bargaining took place, even though the parties never reached an
agreement on a weekly salary for practice squad players.38 2 Thus, the
375. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 127 (an example of a waiver appears in Clarett, but
this particular waiver should have been invalid because it waived a provision never bargained
for).
376. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 298, at 1386.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616 n.17 (8th Cir. 1976).
380. See id.
381. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979).
382. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238 (1996).
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parties will not have to go to great lengths to create imagined quid pro quo
because an actual concession is unnecessary, only a discussion is required.
Parties need not increase the length of a CBA to ensure that it
contains each bargained-for provision. The Supreme Court in Brown noted
that the nonstatutory exemption was not limited "only to understandings
embodied in a collective bargaining agreement., 383  The district court
decision in Clarett took this position to heart, as it looked outside the
collective bargaining sessions between the NFL and NFLPA and analyzed
the entire history of collective bargaining in the NFL when trying to
determine if the draft eligibility provision was the subject of bona-fide
negotiations.384 The ability to apply the nonstatutory exemption using
evidence outside the text of the agreement demonstrates that the discussion
itself is significant, not an articulated quidpro quo.
Finally, while discussion is key to Mackey's third prong, collective
bargaining sessions will not needlessly be extended by requiring people to
verbally acknowledge every element of a CBA. Parties to a CBA will be
able to stipulate to, or otherwise waive, agreed-upon provisions, provided
that a discussion has occurred over those provisions in the past. The Eighth
Circuit noted that the NFL initially imposed the Rozelle Rule unilaterally
upon a weak NFLPA, and that the Rozelle Rule never changed in
subsequent CBAs. 385 The Eighth Circuit held that accepting the status quo
when the provision had never been collectively bargained for did not
constitute bona-fide collective bargaining.386 Implicitly, this means that a
court could uphold a provision that had once been collectively bargained
for if it is adopted into a new agreement to maintain the status quo. The
decisions in both Bridgeman and Powell conform to this understanding, as
both courts applied the nonstatutory exemption to collectively bargained-
387for provisions past the expiration of the CBA. In essence, the courts in
Bridgeman and Powell upheld previously bargained-for provisions by
maintaining the status quo. Following this lead, any stipulation agreed to
by two parties should be upheld, provided that they have previously
discussed the stipulation in collective bargaining.
In sum, the Mackey test will not stall collective bargaining by
requiring needless discussions in order to secure terms already agreed
upon. To satisfy the third prong of the Mackey test, parties must discuss
383. See id. at 243.
384. See Clarett I, supra note 42, at 396.
385. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
386. Id.
387. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987); Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d
1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1989).
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the provision at some point during the process. Discussions do not need to
lead to a specific quid pro quo, be memorialized in writing, nor be
discussed anew at each collective bargaining session to be protected from
anti-trust scrutiny by the nonstatutory exemption.
3. The Second Circuit's Test Potentially Leads to the Breakdown of the
Collective Bargaining Process
The Second Circuit's test for applying the nonstatutory exemption
grew out of Wood, Caldwell, and Williams, and came into its own in
Clarett.388 Each of these cases stressed the importance of federal labor
policy and inquired whether exposing the challenged provision to anti-trust
scrutiny would subvert federal labor policy.389 Unfortunately, the Second
Circuit's Clarett opinion created exactly what it hoped to avoid: it
provided incentives for the parties to the CBA to disregard the collective
bargaining process. By broadly accepting any term that is in an agreement
collectively bargained for as a whole, the Second Circuit's test encourages
a union to decertify, thus opening the door to federal labor policy
destruction.39°
Under the Second Circuit's test, terms never collectively bargained
for by the union can make it into an agreement as long as the agreement is
collectively bargained for as a whole. The result of this permissive view of
collective bargaining is that a party could unilaterally impose stealth or
hidden terms.39 1 Such terms could appear via a vague waiver, as in
Clarett,392 or under the guise of continuing the status quo, as in Mackey.
393
Players who are burdened by hidden or surprise terms in a CBA have
two options. The first option is to wait until the CBA expires, 394 which
could be several years, and then fix the problem by refusing to implement
the provision again. The second option-assuming that the employees will
not want to wait until the next collective bargaining session-is to decertify
the players' union, thereby voiding any anti-trust protection that the
disfavored provision enjoys. 395 Indeed, a group within the NBPA discussed
this option in 1995.396 With most CBAs in professional sports leagues
388. Clarett II, supra note 172, at 134-35; see also supra Part III.B.2.
389. See, e.g., Clarett II, supra note 172, at 141; see also supra Part III.B.2.
390. See Sum, supra note 118, at 825-26.
391. See id. 824-25.
392. See Clarett II, supra note 172, at 142.
393. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
394. See Sum, supra note 118, at 825-26.
395. See id.
396. See Howard-Cooper, supra note 94, at C 1.
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lasting multiple years, the latter option of decertification is the only real
option for players seeking to immediately get rid of an unfavorable hidden
term.
Although decertifying the players union may be the most expedient
method for players to change the unwanted terms in the CBA,397 it subverts
federal labor policy by actively encouraging the destruction of the
collective bargaining process398 and forcing courts to choose sides, rather
than allowing employers and unions to compromise. In short, the Second
Circuit's expansive application of the nonstatutory exemption, which
protects terms not bargained for, will encourage decertification and destroy
federal labor policy's preference for collective bargaining.399
VI. WHAT'S NEXT?
What's next for a prep phenom? Though some commentators predict
a challenge to the age limit400 regardless of the suit's likelihood of
success,4 1 an immediate lawsuit is not guaranteed.40 2 Currently, high
397. Sum, supra note 118, at 826; see e.g., Richard Sandomir, Free Agency: Fighting the
Good Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at Al (noting NFL players decertified their union in 1987,
leading to free agency).
398. See Sum, supra note 118, at 826.
399. The imposition of terms never collectively bargained for differs from the situation in
Brown. In Brown, the NFL imposed, after impasse, a term not agreed upon by the parties.
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. at 238 (1996). Impasse is a term of art and the court
pointed out that impasse is not the end of negotiations. Id. at 245. Therefore, a term imposed at
impasse can be refined to mutual satisfaction when discussions continue anew. By contrast, a
term never collectively bargained for that becomes part of a CBA is valid until the CBA expires.
Under Brown, players have no incentive to decertify because negotiations can continue, but under
the Second Circuit's policy the stealth term's permanent nature encourages decertification.
400. See Blair Clarkson, NBA's Minimum Age Likely Will Face Lawsuits, L.A. DAILY J.,
June 30, 2005, at 1 (quoting Mississippi College School of Law professor Michael McCann
predicting that there will be a legal challenge); Wurth, supra note 361, at 105 (predicting that if
an age limit is imposed it will be almost immediately challenged).
401. See supra Part IV (predicting that under either the Second Circuit or Eighth Circuit test
a court will apply the nonstatutory exemption and uphold the NBA's CBA). But see Michael A.
McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 27-28, on file with author) (predicting that a
challenge to Article X brought in the Sixth Circuit could win and stating that a challenge should
not be filed in the Second Circuit; also noting that despite the numerous documented successes of
preps to pros players in the ten years, the issue of whether it was prudent to bargain for a preps to
pros ban will not be addressed by a court in the Second Circuit when determining if the
nonstatutory exemption applies).
402. See Eric Prisbell, Coaches Say New NCAA Academic Plan Is Flawed, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2005, at El (noting that Greg Oden, the projected first pick in the 2006 NBA draft before
the age limit was imposed, made a commitment to attend The Ohio State University, implying he
will not challenge Article X in court).
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school stars only have to wait a year after graduation to enter the NBA, and
they have numerous ways to spend their time during the wait.4 °3 However,
because these alternatives may not always be available or may become less
attractive, an Article X challenge may be more appealing. In addition, high
schoolers could pursue other legal remedies.
A. Inferior Opportunities
High School players may challenge Article X because other options
available to them seem inferior. This part examines two of those options.
1. NCAA Basketball Academic Crackdown
Assuming that a high schooler satisfies the academic prerequisites for
college 40 4  one opportunity is for up-and-coming players to play
temporarily in the NCAA.4 °5 In the past it has been common for players to
leave college early 40 6 after they gained maturity both on and off the court in
college.407 However, the NCAA has begun cracking down on programs
that do not graduate players, as demonstrated by the adoption of academic
reforms-known as Academic Progress Rates-that provide for escalating
penalties for poor graduation rates.40 8 While some coaches are unfazed by
the rule change,40 9 others say they are no longer interested in "one and
done" players.410 If the new NCAA rules make it difficult for coaches that
do not graduate players to coach effectively, these same coaches may think
twice about accepting one-year players. The inability to play for a major
403. See Thamel supra note 18, at 8.
404. Mark Heisler, Pros Prepping For Youth Movement, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at C4
(noting that Kevin Garnett's academic ineligibility motivated him to declare for the NBA Draft).
If a high schooler does not meet NCAA entrance requirements, thus taking away the option of
playing college basketball, it could influence the decision to challenge Article X.
405. See Thamel, supra note 18, at 8.
406. Chris Tomasson, Haywood's Message to NBA: Grow Up, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Colo.),
Feb. 18, 2005, at 19N (noting that for twenty years after the Haywood decision most players
stayed in college for at least two years).
407. See Rick Sadowski, Pioneer Haywood Pleased With Limit, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Colo.), June 23, 2005, at 16C.
408. See Tim Griffin, NCAA Academic Reforms, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 27,
2005, at IC (noting that penalties such as stripping scholarships and banning teams from post-
season play); see, e.g., ESPN.com, Few Big Names to Lose Scholarships Based on APR,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2349787 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
409. See Prisbell, supra note 402, at El (noting five of the last seven coaches to lead a team
to the NCAA title did not express concern about recruiting a player who might leave early).
410. See Jeff Rabjohns, Players' Motivation Comes Into Question, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
July 10, 2005, at 4C (paraphrasing University of Louisville coach Rick Pitino).
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college program may influence a high schoolers' decision to challenge
Article X.
2. NBDL Salary Disparity
Another option is the NBDL, which NBA commissioner Stem has
tried to make more accessible as a minor league and act as an alternative
for high schoolers by lowering the minimum age from twenty to
eighteen. 411 However, the average yearly salary for a player unaffiliated
with an NBA team, which a high school player would be, is between
$12,000 and $24,000.412 In contrast, former preps to pros player Dorell
Wright makes $12,500 per game while playing for the NBDL, because he
is affiliated with an NBA team.413 The significant disparity between salary
levels could motivate a high schooler to sue.
B. Other Legal Theories
Another potential reason Article X could be challenged is that it can
be combined with a related challenge to the CBA. This part looks at two
potential challenges.
1. Right of Fair Representation
The first legal theory rests upon the fact that members of the
collective bargaining unit are owed a right of fair representation by the
union.4 14 Since high schoolers are considered members of the bargaining
unit,415 and the NBPA serves as an exclusive bargaining representative, the
NBPA owes them a right of fair representation. Case law indicates that the
duty of fair representation is breached when the union's conduct towards a
portion of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or is in bad
faith.
416
From the Second Circuit's opinion it appears that Clarett made the
arbitrariness argument, but was rejected.417  The standard to prove
411. Thamel, supra note 18, at 8.
412. Ethan J. Skolnick, D-League, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 11, 2006, at 1C.
413. Id.
414. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
415. See Clarettl, supra note 42, at 393.
416. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
417. Clarett II, supra note 172, at 141 ("Clarett, however, stresses that the eligibility rules
are arbitrary and that requiring him to wait another football season has nothing to do with whether
he is in fact qualified for professional play. But Clarett is in this respect no different from the
typical worker who is confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not
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arbitrariness or the second option, bad faith, is difficult to meet, as
"substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action[,] or dishonest conduct" is
required.41 8 However, a high schooler still has the option to allege
discrimination. A claim could be made alleging, as Jermaine O'Neal
does, 419 that the age limit is based on race discrimination. While it is a
breach of the duty of fair representation to discriminate on the basis of
race, 420 this claim could be difficult to make because the age limit impacts
players of all races. However the union also has a duty to represent non-
union members fairly,421 and thus high schoolers might be able to make
analogies based on past case law, make a claim for violation of the duty of
fair representation, and request reinstatement of eligibility as a remedy.
For example, in Branch 6000, National Association of Letter Carriers
v. National Labor Relations Board, local unions were asked to determine
how vacation days should be allocated for mail carriers.422 The local union
let the employees, whether union or non-union, decide by having all the
employees vote.423 After that vote, union members protested, and the vote
was taken again, this time with only union members voting. This
ultimately led the non-union members to file suit.424 The court stated that a
representative must represent all of the employees in the bargaining unit,
and that the duty of fair representation prevents the representative from
acting based on self-interest, thereby preventing a group of employee
decision-makers from acting for personal reasons.425 The court held that
delegating the vote to the bargaining unit and then taking stock only of the
union votes violated the duty of fair representation because the interests of
the non-union members were not considered.426
Additionally, in Bowman v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a CBA
provision gave preference to union members by favoring the transfer of
possess the qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been set.").
418. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 299 (1971) (internal quotations and cites omitted).
419. See Robbins, supra note 46, at 7.
420. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944) (discussing a
case involving allegations made by black firefighters of discriminatory treatment by the union and
staing, "The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from so doing, and its
members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action.").
421. Id. at 204.




425. Id. at 811-12.
426. Id. at 813.
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non-union members over union members.427 The court first held that the
fact that the provision was collectively bargained for did not insulate it
from the duty of fair representation.42 8  It then held that the union
preference provision unlawfully discriminated against non-union
members.429  The court characterized the duty of fair representation as
"prohibit[ing] the unions from bargaining for or agreeing to any provision
which singles out the employees in the unit who arenot union members for
disparate treatment.
4 30
Under these precedents, a high schooler might have a workable claim.
Following the logic of Branch 6000, if high school plaintiffs can prove that
Billy Hunter and the NBPA did not take into account their interests, it
could be argued that the representatives were acting only in their self-
interest, in violation of the duty of fair representation. Also, following
Bowman, the players could argue that Article X has a disparate impact, in
violation of the duty of fair representation, on non-union members because
it bans some of them from playing in the league. There are differences
between these precedents and a high schoolers' claim-Article X was not
put to a vote like the vacation days in Branch 6000, and high schoolers are
not employees-but the claim could still be made.
2. Clarifying Language in the CBA
Another potential question to ask is what is considered a high school
player's "high school class" for purposes of the NBA's age limit provision
in Article X?4 3 1 Prep basketball players are increasingly taking a post-
graduate year at a prep school to improve academic standing432 or simply to
hone their athletic skills. 433  In addition, some prominent high school
athletes are held back a grade during high school.434
The language of Article X is not clear as to whether the "high school
class" of high schoolers who do a post-graduate year is their original high
427. Bowman v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 744 F.2d 1207, 1210 (6th Cir. 1984).
428. Id. at 1214.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See Peter May, No Limit to Potential Problems, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2005, at C4
(showing the difficulty of this determination based on situations of specific high school players).
432. Josh Barr, Athletes Make the Grade Sooner by Failing First, WASH. POST, July 28,
2004, at Al.
433. See Tim MacMahon, Houston Academy Offers Education in Basketball, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 14, 2005 at IA (featuring the Gulf Shores Academy where high school
players not satisfied with their scholarship offers transfer to gain more time to showcase their
game to recruiters).
434. May, supra note 431, at C4 (noting 2005 Boston Celtics draftee Gerald Green).
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school class or their prep school class. Also, it is not clear whether "the
high school class" of students who are held back is their original class or
the class they actually graduate with. These issues may have to be litigated
to be resolved.
VII. CONCLUSION
David Stem's longstanding desire to impose an age limit is finally a
reality-O.J. Mayo and other talented high school basketball stars will
have to wait to get a shot at the NBA. While high schoolers have a myriad
of options to consider while waiting, a challenge to Article X is still
probable. A high schooler will lose that challenge under either the Eighth
Circuit or Second Circuit's analysis. However, the fact that the result
comes out the same under both tests does not mean there are no
fundamental differences between the two. The Eighth Circuit's test is more
appropriate than the Second Circuit's test because it forces union
representatives to know what, if anything, they are bargaining away, and it
captures the spirit of federal labor policy's preference for collective
bargaining. Accordingly, courts should adopt the Eighth Circuit's test as
the standard.
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